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  6PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE
Ever since the first signs 
of economic recovery 
appeared, I have expected 
that the path forward will 
be gradual and bumpy.  
It certainly has been so far. 
At this point, our journey 
to full economic recovery 
is really just beginning.  
I can assure you, however, 
that my colleagues and  
I at the Federal Reserve are committed to using the tools we 
have to pursue our dual mandate from Congress—to keep 
prices stable and to promote maximum employment. 
We will do our job as central bankers to help our economy 
get back on track. It’s important to acknowledge, however, 
that some long-term goals for economic growth require broad 
commitment from all Americans. Above all, we must not forget 
education’s crucial role in determining economic growth. The 
results of research in this area, including some by economists at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, are crystal clear: One  
of the best ways for cities, states, and countries to increase their 
per capita income is to raise levels of educational attainment.
Educating people may not sound terribly urgent during difficult 
economic times, but when it comes to creating jobs and finding 
people who have the skills to fill them, nothing is more impor-
tant than education. Incomes are largely determined by how 
productive people can be, and education plays a crucial role in 
increasing productivity. Investing in education enables people  
to produce more valuable services in a given amount of time. 
On top of that, an educated populace is better equipped to  
navigate our increasingly complicated financial markets.
That is why this issue of Forefront presents a package of articles 
focused on the compelling returns to education. 
We begin with an interview with Art Rolnick, former research 
director at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, who 
forcefully lays out the unambiguous results of research on early 
childhood education: Preparing children for kindergarten may 
be the single most effective way to foster their future success. 
Rolnick has taken the research a step further and developed a 
pilot program for early education in St. Paul, Minnesota, which 
may be expanded statewide. I look forward to seeing the results.
Early childhood education is a first step. Sustained investments 
in education are likewise important. In “Five Big Ideas about 
Consumer Finance Education,” the Federal Reserve Board’s 
Jeanne Hogarth talks about the intersection between high-level 
research and street-level results. Rounding out our coverage,  
we examine financial education about the housing market  
with a review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s 2010 
Community Development Policy Summit. In particular, we 
look at the effectiveness of mortgage counseling in helping  
borrowers steer through the sometimes-opaque process of  
buying a home.
The policymakers and shapers in these articles share a passion  
and a dedication to achieving progress in education. They have 
moved past agreement on our long-run priorities and dug deeper  
into the nitty-gritty of achieving those priorities. They are taking 
an honest look at what works and what doesn’t. I am hopeful that  
their experiences will give others the courage to leave behind pro-
grams that do not deliver on achieving our education priorities.  
As always, there are no quick fixes. Identifying education invest-
ments as sources of progress is easy, but achieving them requires 
great commitment. These challenging economic times provide  
an opportunity to make decisions guided by a long-term view.  
So, as we slowly recover from the recession, let us lay the ground-
work for a long-lasting economic expansion. Let’s renew our 
commitment to educating Americans.  ■
Sandra Pianalto
President and Chief Executive Officer 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
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A Proposal: Using the CRA    to Fight Vacancy and Abandonment
Update: On June 17, 2010, federal regulators, including the Federal Reserve, 
announced a proposed change to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The 
change would encourage banks to support the Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop  ment. The 
proposal is similar to, and was inﬂ  uenced by, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s 
recent recommendation aimed at easing the vacancy and abandonment crisis 
(Forefront, Spring 2010). The Bank’s proposal would amend the CRA to increase 
banks’ incentives to provide community groups with loans, services, and investments 
that support neighborhood recovery eﬀ  orts.
I commend the Cleveland Fed for entertaining this proposal 
for modifying the system for determining the CRA ratings 
of large retail banks, i.e., those with assets greater than 
$1 billion. If adopted, the proposal would break new ground 
in six important ways:  
  ■   First, it would demonstrate that CRA can be amended on 
a timely basis to address changing economic conditions.  
  ■   Second, it would set a new precedent, albeit subject to 
some signiﬁ  cant restrictions, for giving these banks full 
credit for activities regardless of the geography being 
served.
  ■   Third, it would elevate the importance placed on non-
lending activities such as demolition that also help to 
stabilize and revitalize a community and thus improve 
the ability of local individuals and institutions 
to access credit.
  ■   Fourth, it would give these banks the ability to increase 
the relative importance of the investment and service 
tests in determining overall CRA ratings.
  ■   Fifth, it would off  er, but not mandate, an alternative 
way for these banks to serve communities that have 
been particularly hard hit by the current housing crisis.
  ■   Sixth, it would provide an automatic trigger for 
suspending or reinstating the special rules depending 
on economic conditions and not contingent on future 
votes that would require the regulatory agencies to 
reach consensus in a timely manner.
Adopting the proposed regulatory changes, however, is 
only part of the battle. Banks will need more details in order 
to evaluate the relative merits of sticking with the current 
system or going with the new option. Most banks already 
have a good idea of what they need to do under the current 
system to achieve the same rating again at their next exam. 
For evaluating the new option, banks will need to understand, 
for example:
■   How will credit be determined for REO donations—
number of properties donated, the market value of 
the properties at the time of the donation, or some 
other measure?
■   Will donations of property be given more than the 
nominal credit now given to philanthropic grants under 
the investment test?
■   Similarly, how much value will technical assistance be 
given under the service test, which is now mainly about 
bank branch services?
■   How much in “extra points” will be needed to get an 
outstanding rating on one or more of the lending, invest-
ment, and service tests, and how will the scores on the 
three tests be combined to determine the overall rating?
Without clear upfront answers to these types of questions, 
it may be hard to get banks to make the hoped-for changes 







	 2	 Fall 2010The Community Reinvestment Act did not cause the current 
foreclosure crisis, but it might be able to ameliorate some of 
its consequences. A recent proposal by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland would deploy the CRA to reward banks 
for resolving the vacant and abandoned stock of real-estate-
owned (REO) properties, even if those properties were 
located outside the CRA assessment areas usually used to 
measure compliance.  
The CRA was created in 1977 to counter the practice of 
denying access to credit to particular communities. The 
principle held that if banks were going to set up shop and 
accept deposits from a community, then they should 
reinvest those funds in that community. But recent develop-
ments in banking and ﬁ  nancial services have made this 
premise outdated.
Not only have a variety of alternative sources of ﬁ  nancial 
services arisen, but the neighborhood-centric concept of 
traditional banking has given way to large interstate or even 
multinational banking conglomerates. Consequently, the 
collapse of the housing market has left banks holding onto 
foreclosed properties far from their CRA assessment areas.
The proposal would allow banks to receive CRA consider-
ation for donations or sale of REO properties to community 
develop  ment groups, as well as technical assistance and 
lending to such groups, as long as the investment needs 
of the assessment area are satisfactorily met. This is an 
entirely reasonable way to encourage stabilization, even in 
neighborhoods where the bank does not have a branch oﬃ   ce 
but still has a ﬁ  nancial stake due to mortgages made there.
That is not to say that branch oﬃ   ces have lost their impor-
tance. In the REO context, a local presence facilitates 
cooperation with community groups and a better under-
standing of community needs, which can lead to more 
productive eff  orts to stabilize neighborhoods. Eff  orts to 
ﬁ  ght the tide of foreclosures should also provide impetus 
for banks to aggressively and productively resolve REO 
within existing assessment areas.
What is most signiﬁ  cant about this proposal is its recognition 
of the latent power inherent in the Community Reinvestment 
Act through regulatory discretion. Flexibility within the 
statutory framework is vital to the ability of the Act to keep 
up with changes in the market and address evolving issues, 






I appreciate the information in your new Forefront magazine. 
In the article entitled “Small Businesses: Credit Where Credit 
is Due?” while good points were made, one signiﬁ  cant, 
troubling area of concern was missed: the negative eff  ects 
of over-regulation on businesses. 
I have been a small-town banker for 25 years, and I under-
stand “burdensome regulations.” But talking with small 
business owners over the last 10 years, I have witnessed an 
increasingly uphill battle for all businesses to comply with 
ever-expanding regulations.  
I personally know of many businesses in our local community 
that have closed up shop because they could no longer 
aff  ord the costs of regulation. As such, prudent bankers 
understand how these costs directly aff  ect the bottom line 
of business owners, and we add it to the risk factors when 
making credit decisions. These concerns become ever more 
relevant in a stagnant, down economy. 
 The state of Ohio is particularly tough on both regulations 
and taxes—as illustrated in its ranking in the top ﬁ  ve worst 
states in the Union in which to do business. In addition to 
being a banker, I also am involved in the management of 
two other businesses as well as serve on several boards.  
Small Businesses: Credit Where Credit Is Due?
Regulations alone will make one’s head swim, but there 
are so many that are redundant, unnecessary, or just plain 
ridiculous. And believe me, these are having a very negative 
eff  ect on nearly every business out there.
Lending to a business to cover regulatory expenses, or to 
compensate for the cost of complying with regulations—
when there is no monetary return on the investment—
is risky at best. But many business owners are faced with 
exorbitant regulatory costs for new installs, upgrades, or 
remodeling. There is no upside.
Just recently, I helped ﬁ  nance a local fellow opening a 
very small donut shop. His cost to comply with the various 
regulatory requirements was $18,000. He’ll have to sell a 
lot of donuts to recoup that money, wouldn’t you say?
It’s time to consider ALL risks associated with business 
lending. Perhaps if the Fed would point out the crushing 
eff  ects of over-regulation, some much-needed changes 
would be made that most assuredly would increase business 
proﬁ  ts. And that would bring a smile to bankers’ faces.  
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new one: a crushing load of REO, 
or real-estate-owned, properties. 
These are the foreclosed homes 
that banks and other lenders have 
on their books after failing to sell 
them at sheriff  ’s auctions. In weak 
housing markets, including many 
in the Fourth District, these unsold 
houses too often stand vacant and 
neglected. 
A new volume published by the 
Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland 
and Boston and the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors highlights the 
latest research and on-the ground 
eff  orts to attack the REO problem 
on several fronts. The collection of 
articles, REO & Vacant Properties: 
Strategies for Neighborhood Stabili-
zation, was released in September 
to coincide with a summit hosted by 
the Federal Reserve in Washington. 
The summit aimed to help commun-
ities and practitioners ﬁ  nd the most 
promising practices for addressing 
neighborhood stabili  zation and the 
disposition of REO properties across 
the country.
Among the Cleveland-area 
contributors to the volume were 
researchers at Case Western Reserve 
University. The researchers reported 
a worsening scope to the problem 
in northeast Ohio, off  ering new 
evidence of how REO properties 
further drag down communities. 
In “REO and Beyond: The After-
math of the Foreclosure Crisis in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio,” Claudia 
Coulton, Mike Schramm, and April 
Hirsh found:
  •   Since 2007, almost all properties 
in Cuyahoga County (home to 
Cleveland) that come out of 
foreclosure sales have ended up 
as REOs.
  •   The number of REOs in the county 
peaked in 2008 at just over 10,000 
properties and had declined to 
about 7,300 by late 2009. 
  •   REOs are disproportionately 
concentrated in lower-income 
communities.
  •   From 2004 to 2008, the percent-
age of properties on Cleveland’s 
east side that sold out of REO 
at extremely distressed prices—
$10,000 or less—shot up from 
4 percent to almost 80 percent.
What does this mean for the area’s 
already-battered neighborhoods? 
REOs are often vacant and subject 
to vandalism and further devalu-
ation. Their presence lowers the 







	 4	 Fall 2010The authors’ ﬁ  ndings also indicate 
that most REO properties in the 
county are owned by national lend-
ers, some with no local branches. 
Buyers include many out-of-state 
investors, who may purchase these 
properties sight unseen and take 
a let-it-sit-I’ll-wait-till-the-market-
rebounds approach. They tend not 
to make any improvements, and 
maintenance suff  ers. 
By 2009, REO properties on 
Cleveland’s east side were selling at 
just 13 percent of their pre-fore  closure 
market value. Given already-low 
housing prices and the large volume 
of REO transactions, the authors 
wrote, “these post-REO sales price 
ﬁ  gures have disastrous eff  ects on 
the values of neighboring properties 
not in foreclosure and on the tax 
bases of neighborhoods and 
communities.” 
Though solutions are hard to come 
by, one promising local eff  ort is 
the Cuyahoga County Land Bank. 
That’s the subject of Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland economist 
Tom Fitzpatrick’s article in the REO 
publication. Fitzpatrick explores how 
modern land banks have developed 
into powerful tools: Communities 
acquire REO properties as a way 
to stabilize, and in some cases 
revitalize, at-risk neighborhoods. 
Modern land banks tend to have 
broader geographic coverage and 
to wield wider powers to acquire, 
deconstruct, demolish, and rehabili-
tate inventory, and keep dedicated 
revenue streams—all improvements 
on traditional land banks.
Other approaches highlighted in the 
volume, such as the public–private 
partnership spearheaded by Boston 
Community Capital in speciﬁ  c 
neighborhoods of the city, show the 
distinct ways that communities deal 
with the challenge of their REOs.
The REO volume represents the 
Federal Reserve’s eff  ort to listen to 
stakeholders, analyze various policy 
options for dealing with important 
public problems, and then make 
information available.  ■










Properties Entering and Leaving REO in Cuyahoga County
Prepared by: Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development, Mandel School of Applied Social 
Sciences,  Case Western Reserve University.
Source: NEO CANDO (htt  p:/ /neocando.case.edu), Tabulation of Cuyahoga County Auditor data.
Related	link
REO & Vacant Properties: Strategies for 
Neighborhood Stabilization, the name of 
both a national summit and its companion 
publication, focuses on how policymakers and 
community development practitioners can 
help stabilize the neighborhoods most at risk 
for decline. The publication contains 17 articles 
that shed light on the scope of the problem in 
speciﬁ  c areas of the country and showcases 
some methods for dealing with the challenge 
of vacant and REO properties.
www.clevelandfed.org/Community_Development/
publications/REO/index.cfm
    Properties entering REO
Properties leaving REO
■  Local lenders
■  Government-sponsored entities
■  National lenders












Sniderman:	We’re here this morning to 
discuss early education. How did you 
fi  rst become interested in this topic?
Rolnick:	My involvement was seren-
dipity. A group of us used to meet 
about once a month for lunch here 
in downtown Minneapolis—some 
lawyers, businesspeople, academics, 
and media people. About nine years 
ago, we invited the executive director 
of an organization called Ready for K 










An interview with Art Rolnick, whose research on behalf of the 
Minnesota Early Learning Foundation aims to spur long-term 
economic growth
	 6	 Fall 2010We found that in the Perry preschool study, 
the annual rate of return, infl  ation-adjusted, 
was 16 percent. I don’t think you could fi  nd 
a bett  er public investment.
by a former governor of the state, 
Al Quie, and a former mayor of 
Minnea polis, Don Fraser. Th   e organi-
zation was advocating for early child-
hood education and development. 
I listened to the talk. Th   ey presented 
what I thought was a fairly weak argu-
ment. It was basically a moral argu-
ment, and it’s not that I disagreed with 
it. But it was weak from an economic 
point of view. I felt that if they were 
going to really push this issue forward, 
they should look at the economics of 
investing in early childhood education. 
Policymakers need a way to rank a 
plethora of reasonable-sounding initia-
tives. Th   ey need a way to fi  gure out 
how much to invest in each. And that’s 
where economics comes in.
I made that comment, and that was my 
mistake! Because the board of Ready 
for K, in particular the former governor 
and mayor, started calling and asking 
if I would come on the board and write 
the background paper. 
So I agreed to look into the economics 
of early childhood education. I went 
to work with my colleague Rob 
Grunewald, who was our education 
outreach person at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minnea polis. Aft  er three 
months we sent our report to Ready 
for K. I thought I was done and could 
resume my research on pre–Civil War 
banking. 
I was wrong. Since that report, over 
the last nine years, almost every week,  
Rob and I have received at least one 
call or  writt  en  invitation to speak 
somewhere on this issue. We have 
been to almost every state. 
Sniderman:	What are the critical diﬀ  er-
ences in the way the issues are framed 
and how you evaluate some of the 
choices that need to be made from the 
economist’s perspective?
Rolnick:	We argued that early child-
hood development is economic 
development, and the research shows 
it’s economic development with a 
high public return—very high. 
We looked at four well-known longi-
tudinal studies. I’m going to talk about 
one in particular, the Perry preschool 
study. Th   at was back in the early 1960s 
in Ypsilanti, Michigan. In this study, 
123 at-risk kids and their parents were 
enrolled and randomly divided into 
two groups. One group got a very 
high-quality early education program, 
including master’s-level teachers, small 
classroom size, and home visiting. So 
there was a program group and a control 
group. Reports were produced every 
10 years and we now have a 40-year 
report, comparing the children who 
eventually became adults who were in 
the program, to the control group. 
Rob and I asked a very simple question: 
What was the return on that invest-
ment? It hadn’t been asked quite that 
way before. 
Th   at’s what economists would nor-
mally ask about any proposed public 
investment. We know the cost of the 
two-year program; in today’s dollars it 
was $22,000 per child. Now we need 
to know the benefi  ts. Well, children 
that were in the program were less 
likely to be retained in the fi  rst grade, 
and that’s a signifi  cant saving. Th   ey 
were less likely to need special ed. 
Th   at’s a signifi  cant saving. Th   ey were 
more likely to be literate by the sixth 
grade, graduate high school, get a job, 
pay taxes, stay off   welfare. And the 
largest benefi  t of all, for the children 
who were in the program, the crime 
rate went down 50 percent relative to 
the control group. 
Economists can put dollar values on all 
these benefi  ts and back out the return 
on investment based on the benefi  ts 
and the costs. We thought it would 
be high. We compared it to the stock 
market. Th   e annual yield in the stock 
market, post–World War II, is about 
5.8 percent, so we thought we would 
be doing well if we could beat 5.8 per -
cent. We found that in the Perry pre-
school study, the annual rate of return, 
infl  ation-adjusted, was 16 percent.
I don’t think you could fi  nd a bett  er 
public investment. (In a more recent 
study, James Heckman fi  nds a some-
what lower, but still high, 10 percent 
return.)
Sniderman:	What have you learned 
about what it takes for a program to be 
successful?  Does it extend beyond the 
classroom?
Rolnick:	Let me clarify. When we’re 
talking about early childhood develop-
ment and education, we’re talking pre-
natal to fi  ve years old. Learning begins 
right away. Th   e neuroscientists show 
Arthur	J.	Rolnick
Position:
Senior fellow at the Humphrey Institute in Minnesota 
Past	Position:
Senior vice president and director of research 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Essays:
Include the nationally recognized 
“Th   e Economics of Early Childhood Development” 
Education:
Wayne State University, BS, mathematics; 
University of Minnesota, PhD, economics 
Bio:
Rolnick joined the Federal Reserve Bank in 1970. He 
served as senior vice president and director of research 
from1985 until his retirement this summer. In 2003, 
Rolnick and colleague Rob Grunewald wrote a policy 
proposal that advocates providing high-quality early 
childhood education to at-risk children. Th   at eff  ort has 
grown into a pilot program supported by the Minnesota 
Early Learning Foundation. 
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I think we have the economic case on our 
side.... Unfortunately, we still have a long 
way to go politically to make all this happen.
these investments, because they would 
have been built without public sub-
sidies. I think we have the research on 
our side. I think we have the economic 
case on our side. I think we have the 
healthcare case on our side. Unfortu-
nately, we still have a long way to go 
politically to make all this happen.
Sniderman:	You have stirred up some 
controversy in terms of the program 
design that you had in mind. I wonder 
if you could describe the more unusual 
approach that you’ve been advocating.
Rolnick:	You’re right; some have 
questioned our second essay.
When we looked at the research, a 
number of challenges were suggested:
•  One is that if we’re going to come up 
with a public policy, it would have to 
be one that we could scale up so we 
apply it to all at-risk kids. 
•  Another challenge is we didn’t think 
we could get sustainable results if 
we didn’t engage and empower the 
parents.
•  A third challenge is that you’ve got to 
be able to measure results. You can’t 
just tell the public, “Trust us.” You 
have to be able to show that these kids 
are actually benefi  ting. 
•  Finally, there was the challenge from 
the neuroscientists who said you 
can’t just start at three—you’ve got 
to start at prenatal or birth. 
Based on those challenges, Rob and 
I came up with a policy proposal that 
focused on the demand side of this 
market. As economists, we’ve been 
taught that markets are powerful 
forces. If you’ve got customers with 
economic power, the market will make 
things happen. We proposed a simple 
idea—scholarships. We advocated for 
providing two-year scholarships to 
families living in poverty so they could 
send their children to high-quality 
early childhood programs for three- 
and four-year olds.  Th   at’s where we 
began our proposal. 
Th   en critics said that’s fi  ne, but it doesn’t 
start early enough. Well, we actually 
call our program “Scholarship Plus,” 
and the plus is a mentor, a home-visiting 
mentor that begins prenatal. We advo-
cate that this home-visiting mentor, 
the fi  rst one coming to the door, is a 
home-visiting nurse because of the 
health aspects. Th   at mentor stays with 
the family, or triages if necessary, so 
the family has an ongoing mentor 
who works with them on nutrition, 
prenatal care, and parenting skills. 
Studies show that when you have 
home-visiting mentors working with 
teenage moms especially, you can 
reduce infant mortality and the number 
of low-birth-weight babies. So you get 
at that health component, you get at 
that initial bonding component, you 
make sure there is positive interaction 
between the baby and the mom. Th   at’s 
the beginning of our program. Th   en 
when the child turns three, the child 
receives a two-year scholarship.
Th   e conventional approach is more 
top-down. It focuses on programs, 
not on parents. However, I don’t care 
how many good programs you have 
out there. If you haven’t engaged the 
parents in the program, you’ve failed. 
Start with the parents, focus on the 
parents, and empower the parents with 
resources; the market will provide the 
quality programs.
that if the child is in a stressful environ-
ment during these early years, the 
brain doesn’t develop properly. Th   ere 
was a famous study by Dr. Bruce Perry 
on the orphans in Romania. Th   ey 
were put in cribs and virtually ignored, 
except for feeding time. At age three, 
their brains were about a third smaller 
than what they should have been. 
One of my mentors, Dr. Jack Shonkoff   
at Harvard, makes a strong case that 
the debate between nature and nurture 
is over. We know that environment 
matt  ers a lot for normal brain develop-
ment, starting at prenatal.  In other 
words, there is a critical mental and 
physical health component to early 
childhood education. 
We have a lot of research that says if a 
child is in a healthy and loving environ-
ment, in which there’s bonding between 
the parents and the child, where there’s 
positive interaction, so the child starts 
out cognitively and socially ready for 
school, there’s a high probability that 
the child will succeed in life. If not, 
there’s a high probability she will not. 
Here is my frustration.  We have a 
lot of information that there is an 
extra ordinary public return to early 
childhood education and a small 
return to investing in professional 
sports teams. Indeed, we spend 
billions of public dollars around this 
country building sports stadiums and 
arenas. Th   ere is virtually no return on 
Established in 2005, the Minnesota Early Learning 
Foundation is a nonproﬁ  t organization dedicated to 
developing cost-eff  ective strategies to prepare children 
for success in kindergarten. Over the last three years, 
MELF has raised more than $19 million privately to 
fund an early childhood education program called 
Scholarship Plus. In the foundation’s pilot program, 
Minnesota Early Learning Foundation
low-income parents in a St. Paul community are 
eligible for no-strings-attached scholarships worth 
$13,000 to enroll three- and-four-year olds in highly 
rated preschools. This summer, 625 parents were 
signed up. Now, the foundation is working to expand 
the program across the state. Participants also are 
assigned a “mentor” to work with them on an array of 
parental issues, including nutrition and health.
www.melf.us
	 8	 Fall 2010We actually have a pilot project that 
is testing these ideas, and what we’re 
showing is that, sure enough, the 
market responds. We have a four-
star rating system; you have to be a 
three- or four-star-rated program to 
get our scholarship kids; our scholar-
ships pay up to $13,000 a year. Our 
critics said there wouldn’t be enough 
capacity; they were wrong. Capacity 
of high-quality programs has grown 
with demand, as predicted. (See the 
Minnesota Early Learning Foundation 
website for a description and evaluation 
of this project.)
Some private early ed programs have 
moved into the neighborhood, very 
good programs. Head Start and Mon-
tessori have expanded their programs; 
in the St. Paul schools, early ed capacity 
is growing. Th   e market is responding. 
Our parents are not having a problem 
fi  nding programs. Th   ere were some 
issues when we were fi  rst handing out 
the scholarships, but once the word 
got out, capacity started to increase. 
We’re gett  ing the kind of results that we 
hoped for, and we’re gett  ing engaged 
parents involved in the process.
Sniderman:	Can you describe some of 
the challenges early ed is facing in 
gaining more acceptance and funding?
Rolnick:	We think from an education 
perspective, the case for early ed is 
strong. But if you were just looking at 
early childhood development from a 
health perspective, you would wonder 
why more public resources are not 
being invested in our most at-risk 
children. Th   e research is overwhelming. 
So why are resources not increasing, 
especially in a state like Minnesota? 
We’re an education state, very progres-
sive state, very wealthy state. Th   e 
problem politically is that these kids 
don’t vote, at least not in our state! 
Th   eir parents generally don’t vote. 
Th   ese problems are long-term, they’re 
opaque; you don’t really see them until 
many years down the road. If I build a 
stadium, you see that tomorrow. It looks 
like you’re creating jobs even though 
you’re really not; you’re just moving 
them around. So it is an interesting 
political issue. 
More generally, there is a disconnect 
between our public priorities and the 
research. Th   ere is the research that 
shows there’s a high public return 
to making sure our at-risk kids start 
healthy and ready to learn at kinder-
garten, versus the research that shows 
that investing public money in enter-
tainment and other private businesses 
has a very low public return. And it’s 
not just sports teams that pit one city 
or state against another. But in the 
name of creating jobs, we use public 
subsidies to try to lure one company 
from one state or one city to another. 
Th   is kind of economic development, 
which seems to dominate conventional 
practice, is winning the day. Th   at’s 
where most of our economic develop-
ment dollars go across the country—
and it’s billions of dollars—while early 
ed struggles just to maintain its funding.
Sniderman:	As you mentioned, Art, some 
of the programming is very challenging 
to fi  nd funding for. What sense do you 
have about federal-level support and 
interest in early care and education for 
kids in the areas that we’ve been talking 
about?
Rolnick:	On both sides of the political 
aisle, there’s an understanding of the 
latest research on early childhood 
education and the potential return 
to society. I say both sides of the aisle 
because during the campaign, both 
candidates cited James Heckman’s 
work out of the University of Chicago, 
who has done path-breaking research 
on the importance of investing early 
in children’s education, and cited the 
Minneapolis Fed’s research as well. 
Th   e Obama Administration has made 
a strong commitment to early child-
hood education. Th   ey’re supporting 
something called a “challenge grant” 
that’s working its way through Congress. 
In addition, there is money in the health-
care bill for home-visiting nurses.   
So I think there is a lot of encouraging 
movement in Washington. I do think, 
though, it’s up to the cities and states, 
the local communities, to be more 
aggressive in this area. I think there 





I think it’s going to take a partnership, 
the private sector with the local com-
munities and the federal government. 
But I think it’s important for commu-
nities to get their priorities in order to 
make it clear that this is an area we 
can’t aff  ord not to invest in. 
Sniderman:	I think it will be fascinating 
to come back fi  ve years down the road. 
There will be a lot more children who’ve 
had the opportunity to participate in 
the programs in Minnesota and some of 
the other places that you’ve mentioned. 
We’ll certainly be in a position to know 
quite a lot more than we do today about 
how eﬀ  ective these programs are and 
what some of the critical elements are 
that go into making up high-quality 
programs. I know you’re excited about 
what the future is going to bring as well. 
Rolnick:	I hope fi  ve years from now 
we’ll be out of business! We’ll have 
convinced the public that this is what 
you should do, the scholarships and 
mentors will be there for all poverty 
kids, and then I can go back and fi  nish 
some of my pre–Civil War banking 
papers.    
Sniderman:	Thanks a lot for your time 
this morning; I really appreciate it. 
Rolnick:	Th   ank you, Mark.  ■
In the name of creating jobs, we use public 
subsidies to try to lure one company from 
one state or another city to another. Th   is 
kind of economic development, which 
seems to dominate conventional practice, 
is winning the day....while early ed struggles 
just to maintain its funding.
9 refront F refront FTh   e summit convened top administrators from the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development and 
other regulatory agencies; researchers from universities 
and think tanks; and community development experts. 
Th   ey put on the table such topics as the cultural ideal 
of the American Dream and ways to build wealth in the 
wake of the housing crisis. 
As the experts merged data and anecdotes to frame the 
crisis, one theme stood out: the importance of fi  nancial 
information for consumers. Conversations centered on 
three key ways to help people make bett  er decisions about 
their money:
 • Use clear language
 • Ensure that consumers achieve broad fi  nancial literacy
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10		 Fall 2010How much bett  er off   would Americans be if policymakers 
moved on all three fronts? At the Policy Summit, several 
speakers described how consumer fi  nance education 
eff  orts are likely to take shape in the near future.
Th   e Fine Print
If you’ve ever bought a house, you’ve probably felt the 
anxiety of many prospective homebuyers: What did that 
say? How much do I owe? What did I just sign? Mortgage 
documents are enough to boggle the mind of the best-
educated lawyer. Indeed, federal offi   cials have att  ributed 
the mortgage crisis in no small part to people’s failure to 
understand the fi  ne print. 
By contrast, consider what happened in Canada during 
the past few years. Unlike the United States, Canada did 
not undergo a dramatic increase in mortgage defaults, and 
none of its banks required a government bailout. One 
major reason, according to Virginie Traclet, a researcher 
in the Bank of Canada’s Department of Monetary and 
Financial Analysis, is the way fi  nancial disclosures are 
writt  en in Canada—clearly and plainly. Lenders are 
bound by disclosure requirements as well as banks’ 
voluntary codes of conduct to use plain language. Th   e fi  ne 
print is there, but it is not nearly as fi  ne as what American 
borrowers must try to decipher. (To be sure, many other 
factors contribute to the diff  erence in default rates. A 
paper writt  en at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
for example, suggested that comparatively lax lending 
standards in the U.S. probably played a critical role.) 
In 2000, the Canadian federal government proposed 
the Cost-of-Borrowing Regulations, requiring banks 
to disclose credit product information, such as interest 
rates and fees, to consumers. In the same year, the 
Canadian Bankers Association (CBA)adopted a voluntary 
code of conduct—the Plain Language Mortgage Docu-
ments CBA Commitment—regarding the use of clear 
writing in mortgage documents. In September 2009, 
the federal government amended its disclosure regulation 
to include a plain-language provision requiring that “all 
disclosure under the Regulations be made in a manner 
that is clear, concise, and not misleading.” 
As many have observed, buying a home is the biggest 
investment most people will make in a lifetime, and 
mortgage documents are the most complex. Mortgage 
debt accounts for the largest share of household debt. 
So making informed choices is imperative. 
Straight Talk
 “Plain language,” says Traclet, “can have a signifi  cant 
eff  ect on households’ making an informed decision when 
they choose a mortgage product and, ultimately, this can 
contribute to fi  nancial stability.” 
Arguments against simplifying disclosures abound, with 
the most strident coming from lenders. Th   ey include 
the objections that creating and testing new disclosures 
costs money; requiring disclosures is a market inter-
vention, and interventions do not always improve market 
outcomes (that is, result in bett  er decision-making); and 
if more borrowers understood the terms of their loans, 
some might decide not to take out those loans or would 
demand terms more favorable to themselves. In this last 
point, it is argued that the revenue, profi  ts, and stability of 
fi  nancial services providers would decrease (although it is 
hard to see how giving borrowers bargaining power could 
hurt society).
But improving disclosures can also help lenders. Plain 
language can reduce staff   time by eliminating confusion 
and improving communications. “[If] the performance of 
mortgages is linked to borrowers having chosen a mortgage 
product whose risk characteristics they understand and 
can thus service over the lifetime of the mortgage, then 
banks would have a natural interest in providing such 
easy-to-understand facts and risks,” Traclet says.  
Itzhak Ben-David, an assistant professor of fi  nance at the 
Ohio State University’s Fisher College of Business, agrees: 
“It is important to explain to borrowers about interest rate 
resets in adjustable-rate mortgages, and latent fees, like 
prepayment penalties,” he explains. “It is also important to 
inform borrowers of the likelihood of default given their 
debt-to-income ratio (DTI). For example, ‘One out of fi  ve 
borrowers with DTI of 40 percent at origination could 
not make his payments and had to give up his house.’” 
What if that language appeared prominently in mortgage 
documents? How many borrowers would line up for a 
mortgage if they’re told they have a one-in-fi  ve chance of 
defaulting on it?
Federal oﬃ   cials have att  ributed the mortgage crisis in no 
small part to people’s failure to understand the fi  ne print. 
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So plain language is a start. But we probably need more 
to help consumers make sound financial decisions. For 
example, research suggests that households do not neces-
sarily understand how higher interest rates would affect 
their mortgage payments. In June 2009, the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development noted  
that insufficient financial education tools were partly to  
blame for the financial crisis and that the consequences  
of uninformed credit decisions can be “disastrous.” 
Michal Grinstein-Weiss, an assistant professor at the 
School of Social Work at the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill and a participant of the Cleveland Fed’s 
2010 Policy Summit, points out that homebuyers,  
especially minority and low-income ones, often lack  
information when it comes to the home-buying process. 
In fact, one survey found that 40 percent of African  
American and Latino respondents incorrectly believed 
that a 20 percent down payment was mandatory to 
qualify for a mortgage, and more than 50 percent of this 
same group believed that holding the same job for five  
or more years was required.
Grinstein-Weiss has been studying the effects of financial 
education on participants in the American Dream  
Demonstration, a longitudinal, randomized controlled 
experiment conducted in Tulsa, Oklahoma, from 1998– 
2003. Conceived, organized, and implemented by the 
Corporation for Enterprise Development in Washington, 
DC, and funded by 12 private foundations, this experi-
mental program helped low-income people save for a 
home, school, or business through Individual Develop-
ment Accounts (IDAs) by matching their savings deposits 
with public and private funds.  In addition, IDA partici-
pants attended free classes on general financial education, 
such as budgeting and money management, as well as 
asset-specific financial education classes, such as what to 
look for in a mortgage.
The results were positive: The number of financial educa-
tion hours each participant clocked was associated with  
a 99 percent increase in average monthly net deposit and 
a 1 percentage point increase in deposit frequency. Partici-
pants claimed that it was the financial education—not  
the monetary incentive of the IDA program’s match rates— 
that made the most difference in their success. “If one part 
of the program was eliminated,” Grinstein-Weiss quotes a 
participant, “eliminate the match.” 
Other studies support the importance of financial educa-
tion: One found a significant correlation between the level  
of financial knowledge and sound management practices. 
People who were familiar with financial concepts and 
products were more likely to balance their checkbook 
every month, budget for savings, and maintain investment  
accounts. Another study determined that financial 
knowl edge is the single best predictor of such behaviors 
as budgeting, saving, and shopping responsibly. (For  
additional examples, see related story: “Five Big Ideas 
about Consumer Finance Education,” page 14.)
The Effects of Mortgage Counseling 
But some other studies, including work from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, suggest that general financial 
education programs do not tend to change people’s finan-
cial behavior. Many researchers contend that programs 
should target a specific audience or area of financial 
activity and that this education should be completed just 
before the person needs to use it (for example, just before 
buying a home). 
Nonprofit organizations have been offering home-buying 
programs and credit counseling for years, with generally 
beneficial effects. One study that analyzed nearly 40,000 
affordable mortgage loans targeted to lower-income  
borrowers found that pre-home-purchase counseling  
reduced 90-day delinquency rates by 19 percent on average. 
In another study, researchers found that credit counseling 
had a positive effect on creditworthiness, especially for 
those with the lowest credit scores. Another preliminary 
study found that new or recently delinquent credit card 
holders were more likely to pay on time and to have lower 
revolving balances after receiving online instruction in 
credit management. 
Grinstein-Weiss asserts that the content of the financial  
training should be tailored to building the skills of low-
income people so they can overcome the challenges of 
trying to save. Asset-specific financial education and 
homeownership counseling, she says, may also improve 
participants’ loan performance.
12		 Fall 2010Should Counseling Be Mandatory?
Itzhak Ben-David set out to discover whether mandatory 
asset-specifi  c counseling—in this case, mortgage coun-
seling—does in fact aff  ect loan choice and performance. 
He came up with some surprising results. 
Ben-David’s study was based on an experiment in which 
high-risk mortgage applicants in 10 Chicago ZIP code 
areas were required to receive fi  nancial advice from HUD-
certifi  ed counselors. Th   e results show that a few months 
of fi  nancial education improves fi  nancial decisionmaking. 
And when mortgage counseling is mandated, the default 
rate for borrowers with low credit scores declines by 
4.5 percent. 
Here’s the surprising part: When borrowers who want 
to take risky mortgage products are required to att  end 
counseling, the demand for risky products drops sharply. 
“Borrowers choose less-risky products to avoid going to 
counseling,” Ben-David notes. “In a way, the legislation 
achieves its goal (to restrict the quantity of risky products) 
by threatening borrowers with counseling, not by the 
information included in the counseling itself.”
So it seems that mortgage counseling—or even its 
threat—can be eff  ective. But should it be mandatory? 
Not for everyone, says Stephan Whitaker, an economist 
with the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. “It would 
waste the time of a lot of people who don’t need it,” he 
maintains. “Targeted requirements triggered by some-
thing (location in CRA    assessment area, unusual loan 
product, or receipt of federal/state/local subsidy) seem 
more plausible.”  
What’s Next?
Not all of the chips have fallen when it comes to determin-
ing what types of consumer fi  nancial information work 
best. In Canada, the government has launched a task force 
on fi  nancial literacy that will deliver its fi  ndings in Decem-
ber. Here in the United States, the Financial Literacy and 
Education Commission launched an enhanced fi  nancial 
literacy website, www.mymoney.gov, last April. Th   e 
nation’s new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is 
also likely to make education a key part of its agenda.
What the experts made clear at the Policy Summit is that 
plain language, broad fi  nancial education, and mortgage-
specifi  c counseling are each benefi  cial in their own way 
and serve to complement each other. “Looking forward,” 
notes Ruth Clevenger, Community Aff  airs offi   cer for 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the chief 
architect of the summit, “improved access to, and raised 
levels of, fi  nancial education will be critical to a sustained 
recovery from the fi  nancial crisis for individuals and 
communities.”  ■
Resources
For links to resources mentioned in this article, go to 
www.clevelandfed.org/forefront
2010	Policy	Summit
For the agenda and bios of participants at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland’s 2010 meeting, see 
www.clevelandfed.org/Community_Development/events/PS2010/index.cfm 
The emphasis on plain language is not new. 
Interest in making government documents 
clear has a history in the United States, dating 
back at least to 1966, when  federal employee 
John O’Hayre wrote Gobbledygook Has Gotta 
Go. But until recently, the use of plain language 
remained voluntary. Part of the U.S. Credit 
Card Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Disclosure Act of 2009 is the Plain Sight/Plain 
Language Disclosures: “Credit card contract 
terms will be disclosed in language that 
consumers can see and understand so they 
can avoid unnecessary costs and manage 
their ﬁ  nances.” But this legislation does not 
apply to mortgage documents, even though 
it’s been demonstrated that a large portion 
of homeowners do not understand their 
mortgages and that modest eff  orts to simplify 
mortgage disclosures increase consumers’ 
understanding.
Gett  ing Basic
An image from the 1966 book 
Gobbledygook Has Gotta Go.
13 refront F refront FEducating consumers on how to make bett  er fi  nancial 
decisions may seem simple: Provide the information, and 
bett  er decisions will follow. But Jeanne Hogarth, a former 
high school teacher turned national expert on consumer 
fi  nance education, knows bett  er. Developing fi  nancial 
education programs that make a diff  erence in people’s 
lives is challenging work. It’s not always clear why some 
of these programs improve outcomes and others don’t.
Even so, Hogarth, manager of the Consumer Education 
and Research Section of the Federal Reserve Board’s 
Consumer and Community Aff  airs Division, puts great 
stock in the virtues of fi  nancial literacy. Her research 
strongly suggests that knowledge has a positive eff  ect 
on fi  nancial behavior. Yet she wants to see results from 
more studies. “Nowadays there is more of a push to have 
evidence-driven, empirically based programs,” she says. 
“Th   at gives the research community an opportunity to 
do a lot more of the experimental studies that allow us to 
tease out what’s eff  ective.”
Hogarth, a native of Northeast Ohio, recently visited the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and shared some of 
her perspectives.
Money	Management	Is	Partly	Psychology	
In thinking about how people manage their money, 
economists tend to imagine a population of rational beings 
who base all of their decisions on expectations for the 
future. Hogarth disagrees. Midway through her career, she 
says, she had an “aha” moment that made her rethink the 




Community Relations and Education    Jeanne M. Hogarth is a 
native of Northeast Ohio. 
She earned a bachelor’s 
degree in education at 
Bowling Green State University in 1971 and then 
taught high school in Olmsted Falls. She left the 
area in 1981 after earning a master’s degree and a 
doctorate in family and consumer economics from 
the Ohio State University.
Today Hogarth manages the Consumer Education 
and Research Section of the Division of Consumer 
and Community Aff  airs at the Board of Governors 
in Washington, DC. 
During the 2009–10 academic year, Hogarth was a 
visiting professor at Iowa State University. She is a 
member of the Association for Financial Counseling 
and Planning Education and the American Council 
on Consumer Interests.
About Jeanne Hogarth  “One of the most interesting things I’ve learned is that 
a lot of fi  nancial education isn’t about economics—and 
that might be heresy!” Hogarth said. “It’s really about 
psychology; it’s about how people think and feel.”
Behavioral economists  have explored how psychology 
aff  ects whether people participate in 401(k) plans. Th   e 
optimal choice for a worker’s fi  nancial well-being is always 
the same: to participate. But studies have shown that when 
companies make “opting in” automatic—meaning that 
workers must actively decline 401(k) participation—
more people participate. Th   at’s the sort of result that 
traditional economists might not have predicted. 
Th   is realization has encouraged Hogarth to think about 
how to help people deal with the psychological issues they 
confront when they make home loans and retirement and 
investment decisions. “Your risk tolerance is not a fi  nancial 
thing; it’s a psychological thing. And yet it has a huge impact 
on what happens. Because if you’re not tolerant of risk, 
you’re not going to get a very high rate of return,” she says. 
Financial	Education	Seems	to	Work
Hogarth’s faith in fi  nancial education has grown over 
the years, thanks to some of her own research. In 2003, 
Hogarth and two of her colleagues at the Board of 
Governors, Casey Bell and Dan Gorin, began studying 
the eff  ectiveness of a two-day fi  nancial education program 
for military personnel at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. 
Staff   from the San Diego City College taught the course, 
which covered budgeting, credit, consumer awareness, 
car buying, insurance, and retirement savings.
For the study, the soldiers were split into two groups—
those who took the fi  nancial education course and those 
who did not. Both groups had to come from the same 
population and had to be tracked over many years; these 
are hard-to-satisfy requirements in natural experiments. To 
determine the eff  ect of fi  nancial education, the researchers 
monitored13 positive behaviors (such as comparison 
shopping and starting an emergency fund) and 15 negative 
behaviors (such as paying bills late). Th   ey found that 
soldiers who participated in the fi  nancial education group 
showed more positive behaviors and fewer negative 
behaviors than those who did not. 
15 refront F refront FHogarth has been generally pleased with the study and its 
findings. “Financial education did seem to have an effect 
on specific financial management behaviors,” she wrote 
in a paper presented at the 2009 Federal Reserve System 
Community Affairs Research Conference.  
The	Earlier	the	Better
Not only should consumers have access to financial educa-
tion programs, but the earlier the better. In a 2006 paper, 
for example, Hogarth cited a study (Bernheim, Garrett, 
and Maki)  that showed that consumers who graduated 
from high schools in states with mandated financial educa-
tion averaged higher savings rates and higher net worth.1  
The benefits also persisted over time. The research on 
soldiers stationed at Fort Bliss showed that those who had 
bank accounts when they were growing up became better 
money managers as adults, as did those whose parents 
talked with them about family finances early in life.
Financial	Literacy	Doesn’t		
Always	Mean	Financial	Capability
But being knowledgeable about financial management 
does not guarantee that people will put that knowledge to  
good use. Hogarth pointed out that educators have spent 
a lot of time and effort trying to distinguish between 
financial literacy and financial capability without reaching 
a consensus. 
Hogarth has her own take on the difference: “I think that 
literacy connotes a certain level of knowledge,” she said. 
“Capability takes it one step beyond knowledge to actions. 
I might know intellectually how to play baseball, but if I’ve 
never gotten onto a field and tried to swing a bat at a ball, 
I wouldn’t necessarily be capable. But when I actually get 
out there and start practicing, my capability kicks in. That’s 
how I differentiate literacy from capability.” 
“The bottom line is that we want good financial outcomes  
for consumers,” Hogarth said. “We want them to have financial  
security. We want them to feel comfortable about managing 
their money.”
	1.		 Bernheim, B. Douglas, Daniel M. Garrett, and Dean M. Maki. 2001. 
“Education and Saving: The Long-term Effects of High School Financial  
Curriculum Mandates.” Journal of Public Economics 80(3): 435–65. 
“The bottom line is that we want good financial outcomes 
for consumers,” Hogarth said. “We want them to have  




Hogarth has seen research nail down a connection between  
consumers’ knowledge and behavior—if you know more,  
you do better. But another question looms large for Hogarth  
and others who study consumer behavior. Sometimes 
people exhibit all the “correct” financial behaviors, but 
their outcomes are underwhelming.
Hogarth illustrates the point with an example: “Let’s say  
I max out my 401(k) every year. With the recent decline 
in stock market values, I’ve actually lost money. I’m doing 
all the right things, but my outcome isn’t so great. 
“Sometimes the outcome isn’t caused by the things you do  
or don’t do,” she explains. “It’s because of external factors 
such as unemployment or a decline in housing values.  
The struggle for researchers is connecting behaviors to 
outcomes while also controlling for external factors. I don’t  
know that we’ve figured out how to do that.”
Hogarth acknowledges that it is difficult to track financial 
outcomes five to 40 years in the future. She points to  
the Social Security Administration, which has set up three  
centers for financial security research. The Financial Literacy  
Research Consortium, as the centers are collectively 
called, will create innovative materials and programs for 
Americans at various phases of their lives. For example, 
mid-career professionals and near-retirees will be helped 
to understand the role of Social Security benefits and to 
plan for retirement.
“I think the centers will really help financial educators 
provide evidence-based research to policymakers,”  
Hogarth said. “There are many, many projects that have 
been funded through the three centers that will bring 
some fresh insights on the links between financial knowl-
edge, financial capability, and financial outcomes.”  ■
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Watch clips of our interview with Jeanne Hogarth.  
www.clevelandfed.org/forefront
Published	works
Jeanne Hogarth’s webpage, which includes published works, at the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
www.federalreserve.gov/research/staﬀ  /hogarthjeannem.htm
Forefront:	Do you think the fi  eld of 
behavioral economics is helping to 
marry psychology and economics?
Hogarth:	Behavioral economics has 
been tremendously important in 
raising our awareness of how people 
operate, what they’re thinking, what 
they’re doing. But we also know that 
default options can be set up. One of 
the classic ones, the major tenet of 
fi  nancial management, is pay your-
self fi  rst. Th   e idea of using payroll 
deductions to save into a retirement 
or savings account is good behavioral 
economics. You get automated savings; 
you build up your emergency fund, 
your college fund, your new car fund, 
or whatever it is; and you use some 
of the “out of sight, out of mind” 
psychology to the help your economic 
situation. 
Forefront:	Can you talk about the 
tension that can arise when banks or 
other private-sector fi  rms want to go 
into schools to help educate students 
about fi  nance?
Hogarth:	Th   ere’s an interesting confl  ict 
here. Research shows that kids who 
have bank accounts while they’re 
growing up are bett  er money managers 
as young adults. It’s obviously very 
important for kids to open accounts, 
but the question is how to do that 
without coming across as a giant 
marketing att  empt by a bank. I don’t 
know if there’s a really good answer to 
that. You could partner with multiple 
banks in your community. Or you 
could work through your local 
bankers’ association or trade associa-
tion to raise awareness in the schools, 
and then invite the students to do 
some comparison shopping for a 
bank account.
Forefront:	What’s your thinking on 
the highest and best role of the Federal 
Reserve System in helping to achieve 
good fi  nancial outcomes for consumers?
Hogarth:	In marketing, there’s an 
interesting model for creating aware -
ness and then creating comprehension, 
and having that feed into decision-
making. I think that’s actually a prett  y 
good model for the Federal Reserve 
System. In many of our initiatives, 
we’re at the awareness level. We’re 
just trying to alert people that there’s 
something out there that they might 
want to be paying att  ention to. Th   e 
Fed also has a lot of resources that 
can help people deepen their compre-
hension. But in the end, you have to 
realize that most people’s decisions 
are personal.  ■
Q&A	with	Jeanne	Hogarth
  Jeanne Hogarth discussed her research during a visit to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in June. Watch video clips 
of our interview at www.clevelandfed.org/forefront.
Interviewed by Jennifer Ransom, 
Community Relations and Education
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obvious intuition is backed up by mounds of research, not 
to mention ample observations from the recent fi  nancial 
crisis. In the run-up to the meltdown, for example, Wall 
Street investment banks ratcheted up leverage ratios to 
$30 in debt for every $1 in equity. We all know how that 
strategy turned out.
Economists have long studied how unwieldy debt levels 
can kill businesses: Steep interest payments siphon off   
available cash; highly leveraged fi  rms face higher borrowing 
costs because of the increased possibility they will default, 
and so on. If experts can develop accurate predictions 
of how companies will behave in diff  erent over-indebted 
situations, policymakers might be bett  er able to take 
appropriate policy actions during fi  nancial crises.
More than 30 years ago, economist 
Stewart Myers wrote the fi  rst formal 
theory of how excessive corporate debt 
can lead fi  rms to underinvest in projects 
that otherwise might be profi  table. As Myers 
described it, fi  rms with large debt loads are likely to see 
their existing debt trade at less than face value. So most 
proceeds from new investments will fl  ow not to the fi  rm’s 
owners but to the fi  rm’s creditors. An owner’s line of 
reasoning thus becomes distorted: Why bother to pursue 
costly new projects if most of the future benefi  ts accrue to 
someone else?
Now, two Federal Reserve economists have taken a 
potentially important step forward in understanding the 
debt overhang problem. Filippo Occhino and Andrea 
Pescatori suggest an even greater role for public spending 
and perhaps monetary policy to off  set the investment 
aversion that develops among debt-saddled fi  rms.1 
	1.		 Occhino is with the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; Pescatori was formerly 
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Debt has developed a poor reputation, but it is usually 
quite useful. It allows fi  rms to take on projects they other-
wise couldn’t, ultimately adding value to the economy. 
In fact, debt is a positive feature of developed fi  nancial 
markets. But too much debt—that’s another matt  er.
  Th   e fi  nancial crisis 
  speaks to the peril of 
  the debt overhang 
  distortion. Th   rough 
  most of the past two 
  decades, the level of 
credit market debt in the U.S. economy grew at about 
the same pace as the level of corporate assets. Th   en, in 
the latt  er part of 2007, debt and assets forked in diff  erent 
directions, with debt continuing to rise but assets nose-
diving. Th   e problem wasn’t so much that businesses were 
taking on more debt; it was that their assets were fast 
becoming worthless. Th   e mortgage securities market was 
the fi  rst to plunge, eventually taking down asset values 
across the board.
Unleashed were the problematic channels through which 
high leverage ratios wreak havoc—the overwhelming 
interest payments, the diffi   culty in securing new fi  nancing, 
the impulse to save more and spend less, and the irresistible 
urge of distressed fi  rms to underinvest in the face of 
crushing debt. Th   is last channel piqued the interest of 
Occhino and Pescatori.
Here is how the debt overhang distortion works: Consider 
a fi  rm whose asset values plunge from $10 million to 
$7.5 million. Th   e value of its liabilities remains at $9 mil-
lion. Along comes an opportunity with a projected cost of 
$1 million and projected benefi  t of $2 million. Th   e problem 
is that $1.5 million of that benefi  t will go directly to the 
creditors, and only half a million will go to the fi  rm’s equity 
owners. In other words, it’s a money-losing scenario for the 
equity owners, even if pursuing the project keeps the fi  rm 
alive. (See “Th   e Case for Debt Relief” above for a possible 
solution to the problem.)
Because debt and credit aﬀ  ect business investment decisions 
within their model, the economists can study what happens 
when the value of a fi  rm’s assets abruptly falls, as in the recent 
fi  nancial crisis.  
The debt overhang distortion sometimes provides a 
compelling case for at least selective debt forgiveness. 
When a lender realizes that a ﬁ  rm is very likely to 
default, it may decide to off  er the borrower a break in 
an eff  ort to recoup more of its loan than it otherwise 
would in the event of liquidation.
The key is to reduce the distortion enough so that 
the borrowing ﬁ  rm decides it would beneﬁ  t by con-
tinuing to invest in new projects. As with the example 
of distortion below, $1.5 million of the beneﬁ  t from 
new investment will go directly to the creditors, and 
only half a million goes to the ﬁ  rm’s equity owners, 
making it a money-loser.
Th   e Case for Debt Relief
But if the creditor sees this distortion, it may decide 
to provide some forgiveness on the ﬁ  rm’s debt, 
perhaps decreasing the liability values to $8 million. 
In that case, the $1 million project makes sense for 
both sides—with the project, the ﬁ  rm gains $1.5 mil-
lion. Meanwhile, the debt holders collect $8 million, 
whereas they would have received only $7.5 million 
in the event of default. This logic is behind much 
of the debt relief eff  orts seen on behalf of faltering 
sovereign nations.
“Without forgiveness, ﬁ  rms may have no hope and 
give up,” Occhino says. “But if part of the debt is 
forgiven, then you give ﬁ  rms hope, they put in eff  ort, 
hire, invest, and the value of the ﬁ  rm increases. So 
both beneﬁ  t.”
Filippo	Occhino Andrea	Pescatori
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cost-benefi  t analysis, and even aft  er weighing the fi  rm’s 
goodwill, future growth potential, and revenue oppor-
tunities, the project still doesn’t add up. Th   e pragmatic 
decision is to skip or postpone the project and default on 
the debt. It’s the same motivation that leads homeowners 
to walk away when their mortgage debt far exceeds the 
value of their homes. (Although the fi  rm defaults in the 
example, this is not necessary for the distortion eff  ect to 
persist. Th   e underinvestment problem happens when 
there is a substantial risk of default, even if default does 
not necessarily occur.)
Th   is particular distortion can be devastating. A recent 
study on the eff  ect of the debt overhang distortion found 
that every 10 percent increase in leverage decreases the 
amount fi  rms invest in projects by up to 20 percent. In 
other words, businesses become zombies—they continue 
to exist, but no longer expand. Th   is can have a dampening 
eff  ect on the wider economy.
A New Way to Look at the Problem
Traditional macroeconomic models are limited by their 
failure to account for fi  nancial frictions (see “Limitations 
of Standard Models” above). To get a bett  er handle on 
the size of the distortion, Occhino and Pescatori looked 
at debt overhang from a new angle.
Th   e innovation in Occhino and Pescatori’s work is to 
explain how the debt overhang distortion aff  ects inter-
actions between the business cycle and balance sheet 
variables. Because debt and credit aff  ect business invest-
ment decisions within their model, the economists can 
study what happens when the value of a fi  rm’s assets 
abruptly falls, as in the recent fi  nancial crisis. While it 
is not a be-all-end-all solution to the lack of fi  nancial 
markets in macroeconomic modeling, it is a step toward 
bett  er establishing the linkages.
Occhino and Pescatori show how a macroeconomic 
shock to, say, productivity, fi  nds its way onto fi  rms’ 
balance sheets in the form of damaged asset values. Th   is 
increases fi  rms’ risk of default, which triggers the debt 
overhang problem. Now, fi  rms have smaller incentives to 
invest, knowing that proceeds from investments will go 
fi  rst and foremost to creditors. Decreases in investment 
further raise the probability of default, creating a vicious 
circle in which the initial eff  ects of the adverse shock to 
productivity become both amplifi  ed and more persistent 
over time.
A leading critique of traditional business cycle models—particularly in 
the wake of the ﬁ  nancial crisis—is that they don’t address the ﬁ  nancial 
side of the economy—the ﬂ  ow of funds from investors to ﬁ  rms through 
banks and markets.
Because the ﬁ  nancial side has no relevance, standard macroeconomic 
models allow ﬁ  rms to accumulate huge sums of debt with no need for 
policy prescriptions to keep the economy from suff  ering. That’s because 
in these models, the frictions caused by excessive debt don’t exist. 
Instead, the economy automatically adjusts to new equilibriums. 
Limitations of Standard Models
The real economy—employment, output, and so forth—registers no 
change from frictions when ﬁ  nancial variables like debt and equity get 
out of whack. This failure to replicate the real world obviously limits the 
utility of such models in helping guide policy.
Eff  orts to address this shortcoming began during the late 1990s. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland economists Chuck Carlstrom and Tim Fuerst 
were among the ﬁ  rst to study how ﬁ  rms with weak balance sheets paid 
higher borrowing costs and how this “external ﬁ  nance premium” aff  ected 
the business cycle.
What’s more, crushing debt may persuade fi  rms to pursue 
far riskier projects than optimal. If the project pays oﬀ  , then 
the owners see a benefi  t; but if it crashes and burns, then the 
creditors take the biggest hit.
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Th   e model results square with the general thrust of the 
data. In the model, as in the real business cycle, credit 
spreads widen and default rates mount as the economy 
nosedives. And, as in the data, the model suggests that 
corporate balance sheets remain impaired for a long time. 
What’s more, crushing debt may persuade fi  rms to pursue 
far riskier projects than optimal. If the project pays off  , 
then the owners see a benefi  t; but if it crashes and burns, 
then the creditors take the biggest hit.
In many macroeconomic models, that would be the end 
of the story. Th   e effi   cient response would be to do nothing 
and simply wait for the market to reallocate resources and 
fi  nd a new equilibrium. But Occhino and Pescatori’s 
model recognizes the impact of fi  nancial frictions. Th   is 
opens the door to policy prescriptions, because investment 
is dropping more than it should. If this disinvestment 
becomes contagious, the economic harm could become 
widespread.
At a macroeconomic level, a straightforward way to 
address this problem is with expansionary fi  scal policy. 
Increased public spending and decreased tax rates could 
spur increased production, strengthening fi  rms’ balance 
sheets and at least partly off  sett  ing the debt overhang 
distortion. A similar approach could be considered with 
expansionary monetary policy, but Occhino and Pescatori 
do not explore this option as there is no money, strictly 
speaking, in their model. Th   at’s something for future work.
“In an economic downturn, if you move to expansionary 
policy you can eliminate this extra decrease caused by 
debt overhang,” Occhino says.
Other reforms are being debated in the aft  ermath of 
the fi  nancial crisis. Caps on the levels of leverage that 
fi  rms can carry on their balance sheets might seem like 
another approach to limiting the debt overhang distortion. 
Occhino thinks the risk of overstepping here is signifi  cant. 
“For most fi  rms, borrowing is benefi  cial,” he stresses. “What 
is needed is something to ease the distortion, something to 
keep fi  rms from avoiding investments during downturns.”
Recommended	readings
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Worth, and Business Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium 
Analysis.” American Economic Review 87(5): 893–910. 
Myers, S.C. 1977. “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.” Journal of 
Financial Economics (5): 147–75. 
Occhino, Filippo, and Pescatori, Andrea. 2010. “Debt Overhang and 
Credit Risk in a Business Cycle Model.” Federal Reserve Bank of 
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Th   e pace of the current economic recovery will depend in 
no small part on how well policymakers can address the 
distorting impact of debt, to mop up the mess left   behind 
by the fi  nancial crisis. Understanding why overburdened 
businesses behave the way they do is prett  y important, 
and that is why  steps like Occhino and Pescatori’s could 
prove valuable.  ■
More	on	debt	overhang
See our dedicated webpage for a short video and links to additional 
articles on debt overhang.
www.clevelandfed.org/forefront/2010/09/debt_overhang_landing.cfm
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I knew I wanted to be an economist.” The college was Yale and 
the narrator was Laurence Meyer, writing in his 2004 book, 
A Term at the Fed: An Insider’s View. Meyer did indeed go on 
to become an economist. And not just any economist, but a 
top-ﬂ  ight academic, a central banker, and a principal of one of 
the globe’s leading economic forecasting ﬁ  rms.
What may separate Meyer from so many other economists 
is his ability to commu  nicate well. The Boston Sunday Globe 
noted that “Meyer writes about complex economic issues in 




Meyer was a professor of economics for 27 years and former 
department chairman at Washington University. In 1982, he 
launched the economic consulting ﬁ  rm Laurence H. Meyer 
and Associates and earned a reputation as one of the nation’s 
leading forecasters. He was named to the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors in 1996. His term on the Board lasted until 
2002, after which he rejoined his old ﬁ  rm, now called Macro-
economic Advisers.
Meyer is a fellow of the National Association of Business 
Economics, a director of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, a scholar with the American Council on Capital 
Formation, and a member of the Panel of Economic Advisers 
for the Congressional Budget Oﬃ   ce. He received a BA from 
Yale University and a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology.
Mark Sniderman, executive vice president and chief policy 
oﬃ   cer at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, interviewed 
Meyer on June 9, 2010, in Cleveland. An edited transcript 
follows.
	22	 Fall 2010Sniderman:	Larry, thanks so much for 
talking with me this afternoon. I’m 
looking forward to a great conversation. 
Let me start with the fi  nancial crisis. I’m 
interested in your views at a big-picture 
level. How did this all happen?
Meyer:	It’s probably not a good idea to 
think that there’s one single fl  aw in 
the system that was exposed. I think 
that there were several factors. One 
was rapid fi  nancial innovation—new 
fi  nancial products that weren’t tested 
by market downturns and that changed 
or morphed as they were being 
developed. Th   is is the explosion of 
subprime. It morphed from being one 
thing to being something completely 
diff  erent and much riskier later on. 
And the same thing with securitization, 
a new technique, very valuable, and a 
very good idea, but then it morphed 
again into very complex forms of 
structures that nobody could under-
stand. I think those fi  nancial innova-
tions are very important, and they set 
up the system with expanding risk and 
concentrated risks that weren’t well 
understood.
Second, there’s always a trigger that 
happens, and the trigger was declining 
home prices. Many of us believed that 
home prices never fall. Th   ere’s a good 
historical record of that. I think we all 
appreciate now that the subprime 
market was not viable if home prices 
fell. But since we didn’t think home 
prices would fall, we didn’t worry 
about it.
Th   en third, we just took too narrow 
a view of the subprime problem. I 
myself, and I think more generally 
many macroeconomists, had this 
focus that it’s about subprime—
relative to total mortgages, housing 
relative to the economy  —we’re talking 
about tenths [fractions]. How can that 
be a problem? 
We didn’t see the fundamental 
connection between property busts 
and collateral in the banking system, 
bringing the banking system toward 
insolvency, toward the edge of the 
abyss. Put on top of that the buildup 
of leverage in the system—this acts 
as a multiplier. All these things were 
going to happen, and now they hap-
pened, and the unwinding was much 
uglier than it otherwise would have 
been. Practices evolve more quickly 
than knowledge. Maybe we weren’t 
humble enough about what we under-
stood as bankers, as supervisors, as 
rating agencies, or as macroeconomists.
Sniderman:	What does that tell us 
about the state of macro modeling?
Meyer:	It tells us something very 
important —something we certainly 
should have learned—that macro 
modeling should not be static. It 
has to evolve over time, and we’re 
continuously learning. We fi  nd holes, 
and we try to close those holes. 
But we know in the future there will 
be crises coming, or shocks in areas 
that we didn’t anticipate. We’ll fi  nd 
new holes that we have to fi  ll. In this 
case, there were really so many. 
Th   is notion of the fi  nancial accelerator 
wasn’t just a cute idea that the [Federal 
Reserve] chairman [Ben Bernanke] 
came up with. It was central to our 
understanding of how the macro-
economy works, particularly when 
there are intense changes in fi  nancial 
conditions. So you do get these adverse 
feedback loops that the fi  nancial 
accelerator is all about.
Most of us as macro modelers came 
out of a tradition in which the trans-
mission of monetary policy, the 
fi  nancial sector, is about real interest 
rates, about equity values, about the 
dollar, with virtually no variables that 
we would call credit variables—they 
just weren’t there. In milder times, 
that was OK. Th   at probably got the 
job done. But when the situation 
was the drying up of credit markets, 
dysfunctional credit markets, you 
simply had to give the model more 
information than otherwise. 
Two things seem valuable that we’ve 
tried to integrate into our models.  
First would be “willingness to lend 
variables” from the senior loan offi   cer 
survey. Imprecise as it may be, it is 
a measure of lending terms beyond 
rates. Th   at’s very important and 
that wasn’t there, and I think we can 
integrate that. And the other is credit 
spread variables—Baa corporate rate 
relative to, say, a Treasury rate. Th   e 
reason that’s important is that a risk 
variable gives an indication of the risk 
appetites and risk aversion that come 
into the system when there are fi  nan-
cial crises. And that variable tends to 
be very important in spending equa-
tions as well.
Sniderman:	Should we expect to be 
living with our mainstream workhorse 
macro models for some time, and should 
we feel good about that? Is there enough 
progress there?
Meyer:	I love that question! So I think 
we have two kinds of modeling tradi-
tions. First there is the classic tradition. 
I was educated at MIT. I was a research 
assistant to Franco Modigliani, Nobel 
laureate and the director of the project 
on the large-scale model that was used 
at the time at the Federal Reserve 
Board. Th   is is the beginning of modern 
macro-econometric model building. 
Th   at’s the kind of models that I would 
use, the kind of models that folks at 
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Th   ere’s also another tradition that 
began to build up in the late seventies 
to early eighties—the real business 
cycle or neoclassical models. It’s 
what’s taught in graduate schools. 
It’s the only kind of paper that can 
be published in journals. It is called 
“modern macroeconomics.”
Th   e question is, what’s it good for? 
Well, it’s good for gett  ing articles 
published in journals. It’s a good way 
to apply very sophisticated computa-
tional skills. But the question is, do 
those models have anything to do 
with reality? Models are always a cari-
cature—but is this a caricature that’s 
so silly that you wouldn’t want to get 
close to it if you were a policymaker? 
My views would be considered out-
rageous in the academic community, 
but I feel very strongly about them. 
Th   ose models are a diversion. Th   ey 
haven’t been helpful at all at under-
standing anything that would be 
relevant to a monetary policymaker 
or fi  scal policymaker. So we’d bett  er 
come back to, and begin with as our 
base, these classic macro-econometric 
models. We don’t need a revolution. 
We know the basic stories of optimizing 
behavior and consumers and businesses 
that are embedded in these models. 
We need to go back to the founding 
fathers, appreciate how smart they 
were, and build on that.
Sniderman:	Wouldn’t inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions be a counter-example? That has 
become an important variable in many 
classical macro models that policymakers 
use to help them construct their inﬂ  ation 
forecasts. Isn’t that at least one place 
where we see this interplay between the 
research agenda in macro modeling and 
the practical use of models?
Meyer:	A brilliant question! And you’re 
absolutely right. Th   is is a good example 
of interplay between the classic and 
modern macro approaches. It is true 
we had a push toward smaller models. 
Th   is happened because if you want to 
use these forward-looking expectations, 
in the form in which modern macro 
does, forward-looking expectations 
that are model-consistent, it’s really 
hard to do if you have a huge macro-
econometric model. It’s very easy 
to do in the smaller, modern macro 
models. But I think what you saw is 
exactly what you are suggesting, that 
it jumped out of those models and 
became a key area for research and 
integration into the large-scale macro-
econometric models. 
But that doesn’t mean policymakers 
should say, “I like these modern macro 
models because they treat expectations 
the way we should.” Th   e Federal 
Reserve Board’s classic econometric 
model treats expectations the way you 
think they should, but it’s a richer, 
more valuable model for policymakers, 
number one. And number two, do you 
really think that you want to model 
individuals as having their forward-
looking expectations based on solving 
a model out 20 years? I don’t think that 
makes any sense at all. You need small 
models to do that, but the reality is 
that expectations are formed, they’re 
forward-looking, but we don’t have any 
idea what the true world looks like.
Our models are caricatures. Everyone 
has got a diff  erent model in his head. I 
think we learn something about trying 
to get forward-looking expectations 
into our model. We model the Phillips 
curve in a way that is very important. 
We have long-term expectations 
directly in the model, playing a very 
important part. Th   at’s something that 
we didn’t used to do. Th   at’s the way the 
profession advances in these classical 






	 24	 Fall 2010Sniderman:	One thing models can do is 
provide diﬀ  erent scenarios about what 
the future might look like; models that 
provide simulations thousands of times 
to give us a distribution of outcomes that 
could help us understand the future 
possibilities a little more richly. Should 
we as policymakers be looking for more 
modeling of that spirit, that spirit of 
scenario-planning and distributions 
about outcomes?
Meyer:	I think the answer is absolutely 
yes. It’s not such a simple task to build 
a sensible, interesting, alternative sce-
nario. I think we should be constantly 
refreshing and coming up with sensible 
ideas in each forecast round of what 
are clearly risks that are on the horizon 
we want to work into our alternative 
scenario. 
Even more important, we’ve got to sit 
down every once in a while and say, 
“Hmm. What’s the worst thing you 
could think of happening? Tell me 
something really bad. Find a hot spot.” 
Maybe it’s something nobody is 
thinking about. Maybe we could have 
thought about this incredibly rapid 
growth in subprime and structured 
products and said, “Whoa, what could 
that mean?” Or we could have thought 
about sovereign debt developments that 
were going on and were percolating in 
Europe. It’s not just looking at these 
incremental things—what happens if 
this fi  scal plan is changed? what happens 
if oil prices go up?—but looking at 
these worst-case scenarios.
Sniderman:	Of course, that’s not the 
model itself issue; that’s the human 
element.
Meyer:	Absolutely. You always have 
to come back to that. So many times 
people ask me, “What are the rules for 
forecasting, what are the ingredients?” 
And I say, “It’s very simple. It’s one part 
science; that’s the model. One part art, 
that’s your judgment. And one part 
luck. Th   at’s how you become a really 
good forecaster!”
Sniderman:	We’ve seen a lot of innova-
tions during the fi  nancial crisis in terms of 
monetary policy. Are there any features 
in monetary policy design that you think 
should remain more permanently?
Meyer:	To begin to address this ques-
tion, it’s useful to make a distinction 
between what I call liquidity policy 
on the one hand and monetary policy 
on the other. By liquidity policy, I 
mean providing enough liquidity when 
there’s a panic and the market just 
wants to hold a lot more liquidity. To 
prevent that from having powerfully 
negative impacts on the economy, you 
give it to them. 
Th   e Federal Reserve and central banks 
around the world acted as liquidity 
providers of last resort. Th   ey all found 
ways to do that. Th   e Fed was extra-
ordinarily creative, very aggressive. 
You have to give an A-plus to all those 
operations. Th   ey saved the day. You 
also have to give high marks to the 
fact that the liquidity programs were 
designed so they would naturally go 
out of business as the panic dissipated. 
And now the Fed has closed the door 
on them because no one was there 
anymore. 
So that’s gone—beautiful. Central 
banks all around the world did a great 
job. Now we’re talking about monetary 
policy and we say, “Th   at’s just a lot 
more complicated!” And we have a 
disagreement about what’s really 
part of this. Does it matt  er what the 
size of the balance sheet is? Does it 
matt  er how many reserves you have 
in the system? Or do you just need to 
raise rates, using interest on reserves? 
I’m sure you and I could have a nice 
debate on that. 
We’ve never had this superabundant 
level of reserves. We’ve never had this 
size of a balance sheet. So, for reasons 
I think we can understand, there’s a 
desire to do all of these things—shrink 
the balance sheet, drain reserves, and 
raise rates. But we’ve never taken these 
things away. We put them in, and now 
we’re trying to take them away. We’ve 
never done that before. 
So we don’t know, really, what the 
impact is if we begin to do asset sales 
today. How can we unwind that 
balance sheet without having such 
adverse circumstances on the markets 
that we regret it? We’re learning about 
that, too. I think views have changed 
dramatically even over the last six 
months or so with market participants 
much less concerned about the market 
consequences of asset sales. Th   ere are 
three things that we have to get done, 
and we have tools for every one of 
them. For draining reserves, we have 
reverse repos and term deposits. For 
shrinking the balance sheet, we can 
just let it run off   or we can sell assets. 
And for raising rates, even there we 
have complementary roles of both 
raising interest on reserves and man-
aging reserves at the same time. 
Th   e Fed was more aggressive and more 
eff  ective than any other central bank 
in the monetary policy dimension. 
Th   at’s because other central banks, 
whether they admitt  ed it or not, were 
doing what we call quantitative easing.  
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banks didn’t do, because the Fed was 
in unique circumstances, was make 
use of the mortgage-backed securities, 
or MBS, market. The Fed was allowed 
to hold MBS in its portfolio, and yet 
MBS was a market that had become 
illiquid and distressed. It was tied to 
the housing market, which was under 
incredible pressure. The Fed was able 
to go into that market and have big 
impacts because the market was so 
distressed and illiquid. 
That’s the good news. The bad news  
is now we’ve still got all those assets 
on the balance sheet. How do we get 
rid of them? Being the most aggressive  
and effective during the stimulus means  
that you’re the most challenged when 
it comes to exiting.
Sniderman:	There’s been a long-running 
debate about how central banks should 
deal with asset bubbles. One of the issues  
that’s come out in the wake of the 
financial crisis has been the interplay 
between using regulatory tools and 
techniques as opposed to, or in conjunc-
tion with, monetary policy. Do you have 
thoughts on that spectrum?
Meyer:	This is a very important and 
evolving area of thought among  
central banks. We really should start 
by making a distinction between 
types of bubbles, between equity 
bubbles and property bubbles. We 
lost something like $7 trillion in the 
bust of the tech bubble. Sounds like 
a lot, but the economy just shrugged 
it off—with a very shallow and very 
short recession. 
Equity bubbles are just not a big deal. 
But property bubbles are absolute  
killers. We know that from historical  
experience. The difference is that 
property is held by leveraged institu-
tions, are the collateral of the banking 
system, and if you make your banking  
system insolvent, you’ve got real 
problems. 
The good news here is that although 
we don’t have good supervision and 
regulation procedures for dealing with 
equity bubbles, we do for property 
bubbles. We’ve got a lot of ways of 
handling that. We could lower the loan- 
to-value ratio—essentially increase 
the down payment that people have to 
have on their homes to build a better 
capital cushion. We could do a whole 
variety of things on the regula tory side. 
We could increase capital requirements 
against those properties that seem to 
be more risky because of bubble-like 
conditions. We could do a whole  
variety of things that in principle 
should be, could be, effective.
The question is, would we recognize 
that a bubble was emerging in time to 
implement supervisory and regulatory  
policies that could have some effect? 
My views have changed a lot since I 
was on the Board. I’m a firm believer  
now that you can always catch bubbles 
and identify them in time to do 
some  thing about them before they 
get dangerous. The question is, what 
to do? The first line of defense—and 
this is certainly what the chairman 
[Bernanke] and others have said—is 
supervisory and regulatory policies.
But we have to be realistic. It might 
work; it might not. And so the big  
question for central bankers is there- 
fore, what do you do if it doesn’t 
work? Do you have to do something 
in addition? That’s the real issue— 
do you want to use monetary policy 
itself, and do you want to lean against 
bubbles even when the broader 
macro  economic conditions would 
not lead you to, for example, want to 
tighten? That is a taxing issue. 
The issue is less whether you can 
identify a bubble than what do you 
do if you think it’s emerging. I’ve come 
away with a very different under-
standing of the risks of allowing  
bubbles to go unchecked. But that’s  
property bubbles. I’m not so concerned  
with equity bubbles. Property bubbles 
—that can be handled to some extent 
by supervision and regulation, but I 
think we should be very open minded 
here. We’re searching, we’re debating, 
we’re not sure what monetary policies 
should or could do in those circum-
stances. If we come to that place again, 
I’m sure there will be a very good 
debate in the Federal Reserve System, 
as there should be, before deciding 
whether to be more pre-emptive than 
was the case before.
Sniderman:	What is it that you wish the 
general public would better understand 
about central banks and their role in the 
economic system in which we live?
Meyer:	What should the public know? 
First of all, the public has its represen-
tatives in Congress. And Congress 
has a very important job overseeing 
the Fed. I’ve said this many times—
wouldn’t it be good if Congress learned  
a little bit more about monetary policy  
and how it works? I’m always amused 
and distressed about how poor the 
questions are during Congressional 
oversight committee hearings. The 
first part of the public I’d like to see 
understand more about monetary 
policy is the Congress, particularly 
members of the oversight committees.
Other than that, I think it’s important  
for the public to understand two things:  
the responsibilities of the Fed—what 
you should be holding it responsible 
for and what you shouldn’t be holding 
it responsible for—and then the limits 
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It’s partly the limitations of our knowl-
edge. It’s partly the limitations of what 
central banks’ tools can accomplish 
in the real world. But I would say to 
understand what they do, what their 
responsibilities are, and then under-
stand how they try to achieve those 
objectives and appreciate that there 
are limits. When you want to hold 
central banks accountable, understand 
that perfection in central banking 
is no more possible than it is in any 
other profession.
Sniderman:	Maybe you can leave us 
with some thoughts on things you’ve 
been reading these days?
Meyer:	My wife and son always 
warned me that if anybody asked me 
that question, I shouldn’t even answer 
it because they view my reading list as, 
shall we say, not intellectual enough to 
go along with my reputation. 
I have two sets of readings on my 
night table. One is books on the 
fi  nancial system and recent history 
in particular. Too Big to Fail [Andrew 
Ross Sorkin], is like a story unfolding 
before you, and I’m in the middle 
of that one. Th   e Black Swan [Nassim 
Nicholas Taleb] has fascinating stories 
about the weight that should be given 
to improbable events, brainstorming 
on catastrophic things that could 
happen, and how to protect yourself 
in advance from those possibilities. 
And then I’ve got the book by Michael 
Lewis, Th   e Big Short [reviewed on page 
28 of this issue], that’s on my list.
Finally, I read mysteries, spy novels, 
and my current group is by the author 
from Sweden, Stieg Larsson, Th   e Girl 
with the Dragon Tatt  oo and all the ones 
that followed. Fantastic reading. Th   ese 
books are insanely popular all around 
the world. Th   is is a series that has really 
caught my att  ention, and I’ve got one 
more of those to go.
Sniderman:	Thanks for taking the time 
to talk with us today.  ■
27 refront F refront FIn the past year, at least 20 books on the fi  nancial crisis 
have crossed my desk. I have read parts of all of them. 
Some are excellent—insightful, behind-the-scenes looks 
at the people and policies that contributed to and then 
reacted to the crisis. Other books, alas, are not so splendid
—way too technical, so inside baseball that they make 
no sense to the lay reader.
So if you are only now gett  ing around to deciding which 
tales to read about the fi  nancial crisis, I am here to help. A 
good place to start is ￿   e Big Short: Inside the Doomsday 
Machine. Michael Lewis, an editor at Vanity Fair, writes a 
novelistic account of the crisis that follows four hedge fund 
managers who predicted the housing market crash as early 
as 2004. Th   e quartet aggressively took “short” positions 
on mortgage-backed securities through the purchase of 
a type of insurance called a credit default swap (CDS). 
Essentially, they were bett  ing the market would tank, and 
how right they were. 
Th   e protagonists initially met resistance from investors and 
bankers: Why were they wagering against a market that 
was seemingly going so well? Th   ey also faced diffi   culty in 
gett  ing CDSs off  ered on mortgage-backed securities in 
the fi  rst place. At the time, CDSs were not widely used as 
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	 28	 Fall 2010Said one of the money managers: “Nobody we talked to 
had any credible reason to believe the failure of subprime 
CDOs [collateralized debt obligations] was going to 
become a big problem; no one was really thinking about it.” 
It didn’t take long for the investors to prove their doubters 
wrong. Th   eir bets against the market would eventually 
pay off   in the form of hundreds of millions of dollars. 
At the same time, of course, others were losing hundreds 
of millions with the tailspins of Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and AIG.
￿   e Big Short is strong in conveying the drama in the 
midst of the crisis.  And it is so eff  ective at telling the 
human story that the “hard stuff  ” is much easier to 
understand than in other texts. Lewis excels in explaining 
the complicated investment strategies of those buying 
mortgage-backed securities and selling CDSs, and, 
conversely, those buying CDSs and shorting mortgage 
investments. On top of it all, Lewis is eff  ective in describing 
the oft  en complex and arcane investment instruments 
themselves.  Readers will learn a lot from reliving the 
crisis from an insider’s point of view. 
Yet ￿   e Big Short is not a perfect book. While Lewis 
provides important evidence about what happened in 
the run-up to the fi  nancial crisis, he is not terribly helpful 
in explaining the underlying historical forces in housing, 
fi  nance, and government policy that brought us to the 
brink. Nor is his book deep in discussing the eff  ectiveness 
of the immediate policy response in the context of other 
choices the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and others had 
available. 
Translating the dramatic action in ￿   e Big Short to how 
regulators ought to change their behavior and their rules 
to forestall a future crisis requires wider reading of the 
available literature. 
With that in mind, here are some other good books you 
might consider to fi  ll out your knowledge about the 
fi  nancial crisis:
■   Gillian Tett  , Fool’s Gold: How the Bold Dream of a 
Small Tribe at J.P. Morgan Was Corrupted by Wall 
Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe. Tett  , 
the U.S. editor of the Financial Times, summarizes 
how the credit default swap was “invented” and how 
it evolved to become a key contributor to the fi  nancial 
crisis.
■   Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff  , ￿   is Time 
Is Di’  erent: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Th   e 
authors—both economists—provide a rigorous and 
indispensible historical perspective on the recent crisis.
■   Sebastian Mallaby, More Money ￿   an God: Hedge 
Funds and the Making of a New Elite. Th   e hedge 
fund industry is the focus of this author, an offi   cial at 
the Council on Foreign Relations.
■   David Wessel, In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War 
on the Great Panic. Wessel, economics editor at the 
Wall Street Journal, delivers a fl  y-on-the-wall account 
of Federal Reserve actions during the fi  nancial crisis.  ■
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